Varkiza, Civil War and reconstruction

ProjectGreece.

The History of Greece, from 1800 to today.

A twenty-episode series that recounts the path of modern Greece with sobriety, composure, and documentation.

Episode fourteen.

Welcome to another episode of the series "The History of Greece, from 1800 to today."

In the previous episode, we reached the end of 1944. The German occupation had ended, but the Dekemvriana had brought war to Athens between EAM/ELAS and the government and British forces. The Caserta Agreement and the government of national unity had not prevented the rupture. Archbishop Damaskinos had just assumed the role of Regent, and Georgios Papandreou remained Prime Minister. On 3 January 1945, he was succeeded by Nikolaos Plastiras. The fighting continued until the truce of 11 January paved the way for the Varkiza Agreement.

On 12 February 1945, the Varkiza Agreement was signed. ELAS was to surrender its weapons. The government pledged to guarantee political freedoms, purge the security forces, form a national army, and hold elections and a referendum on the form of government. Amnesty was provided for political offences, though not for acts characterized as common crimes. This legal loophole would be utilized for the prosecution of many former resistance fighters.

The surrender of the main armaments of ELAS was completed, but political normalization did not follow. The police, the National Guard, and right-wing armed groups persecuted members and supporters of EAM. Murders, beatings, torture, rapes, arrests, and destruction of property were recorded in many areas. Historiography uses the term "White Terror" for this anti-communist violence, both state and parastate.

The term does not mean that every allegation has been confirmed or that violence by leftist groups did not occur. It means that, after Varkiza, violence against the Left became widespread and often remained unpunished. The figures published by EAM are valuable but come from an involved party; other sources use different periods and categories. We do not convert a partisan table into a definitive account.

Government instability continued. In April, Plastiras was replaced by Petros Voulgaris. Between October and November, a government led by Regent Damaskinos himself was followed by a government led by Panagiotis Kanellopoulos. On 22 November, Themistoklis Sofoulis became Prime Minister. King George II remained out of the country, while the form of government was supposedly to be decided by a referendum.

At the same time, survival was a daily problem. The occupation had left behind destroyed transport systems, shortages, inflation, and hundreds of thousands of people in need of aid. UNRRA distributed food, medicine, livestock, and equipment. The aid was critical but did not in itself constitute reconstruction: production, administration, and the currency remained fragile, while insecurity hindered a return to the countryside.

The transition from the Occupation also included the issue of collaboration with the occupier. Trials of collaborators took place, but the purges were uneven, and the staffing of the anti-communist state allowed certain former collaborators or members of the Security Battalions to return to armed and administrative mechanisms. This does not mean that the entire government army consisted of collaborators. It means that limited accountability undermined the trust of the Left in the postwar order.

The KKE, with Nikos Zachariadis as General Secretary once again, faced a strategic dilemma: participation in the institutions or a return to arms. Its leadership and the coalition of the Left decided to abstain from the elections, considering that conditions for a free vote did not exist. Centrist forces participated, despite also reporting violence and pressure.

The elections were held on 31 March 1946 under international observation. The United Nationalist Front, dominated by the People's Party, won clearly. The abstention of the Left did not allow its electoral strength to be measured with precision. The international mission judged that the elections generally reflected the will of those who voted, but recorded imperfections and an environment of fear. Consequently, these were neither "flawless" nor "non-existent" elections.

On the night before the vote, armed men attacked the Gendarmerie station in Litochoro. The event is often used as the conventional start of the Civil War. The armed escalation, however, had a prehistory: small groups of persecuted leftists had already returned to the mountains, and the violence of the previous year had not ceased.

After a short caretaker government under Panagiotis Poulitsas, Konstantinos Tsaldaris became Prime Minister on 18 April. On 1 September, a referendum was held on the return of George II. The official result gave a large majority in favor of the return. Allied observers noted pressures, problematic voter rolls, and an atmosphere of intimidation, but estimated that there was a genuine majority in favor of the monarchy. The exact percentage should not be equated with unquestionable social consensus.

George returned in late September, and the Regency ended. In the meantime, the guerrilla groups grew in number. In October, a General Headquarters was formed, and the name Democratic Army of Greece (DSE) was adopted, with Markos Vafiadis as the central military figure. The DSE sought to control mountainous regions and attacked stations, transport links, and small towns. The government responded with military operations, arrests, and emergency measures.

The expansion of the insurgency was not only the result of persecution. From 1946, the KKE leadership moved gradually toward an organized seizure of power, although the exact timing of the final decision is still debated by historians. At the same time, many fighters joined the DSE because they were being persecuted; others were recruited out of political conviction, and others under pressure. The same organization could include ideological enlistment, the need for self-protection, and coercion.

On 1 April 1947, King George II died and was succeeded by his brother, Paul. From January, the Prime Minister was Dimitrios Maximos, head of a broad government coalition. In August, Tsaldaris returned for a few days, and on 7 September, a coalition government was formed under Sofoulis.

Britain declared that it could no longer bear the burden of aid to Greece. On 12 March, President Harry Truman asked Congress for economic and military assistance for Greece and Turkey. The Truman Doctrine placed the Greek war within the early confrontation of the Cold War. American advisors, money, and material gradually reshaped the government army and gave Washington great influence over economic and military policy.

The DSE, on the other hand, used safe passages and received material aid from Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, with Yugoslavia being the most significant channel. The Soviet Union supported the communist camp politically but did not send troops to Greece. Foreign intervention was real on both sides, but not equal in scale, form, or direct control.

The state expanded its camps and administrative deportations. Makronisos functioned from 1947 as a site of detention and ideological "re-education" for soldiers and, later, civilians. Ikaria, Gyaros, Chios, and Trikeri became associated with exile and imprisonment. Many women were gathered at Trikeri, often not for proven armed action, but for kinship, support, or political identity.

In December, the DSE announced a Provisional Democratic Government with Markos Vafiadis as Prime Minister. No country recognized it diplomatically. The Athens government responded with Emergency Law 509, which outlawed the KKE and organizations deemed to be seeking a violent overthrow of the state. Illegality, courts-martial, and death sentences became standard tools of the state.

Executions cannot be summarized with a single number. One category consists of those executed following a court-martial; another of those murdered without trial; another of combat deaths; and another of deaths in detention. Sources differ as to when the counting begins and ends and whether it includes common criminals, political prisoners, or those convicted of armed action. In our narrative, we keep these categories separate.

In late December 1947, the DSE attacked Konitsa, with the aim of securing a town that could serve as the seat of the provisional government. The attack was repelled by the government army. The failure demonstrated the limit between successful mountain guerrilla warfare and the occupation and maintenance of an urban center. At the same time, it reinforced the conviction in Athens that the war required a more massive army and deeper American assistance.

From June to August, Operation "Koronis" sought to encircle the main body of the DSE on Grammos. The insurgents suffered heavy losses but escaped toward Vitsi and regrouped. The numbers of dead, wounded, captured, and deserters in military communiqués are not always comparable. We do not aggregate them into a single, sensational total.

The battle was also waged against the civilian population. The government evacuated villages or gathered inhabitants into controlled settlements, stating that it was protecting them and denying the DSE supplies and recruits. The result was mass internal displacement, the abandonment of crops, and dependence on state or international aid. The DSE imposed conscription, requisitions, and forced movements in the areas it dominated. The possibility of free choice was often minimal.

The issue of children was particularly charged. The DSE moved thousands of children to countries in Eastern Europe, presenting the act as protection from the war. The government spoke of "child abduction" and organized the Paidopoleis (Children’s Cities) under the supervision of Queen Frederica. In both systems, rescue, political indoctrination, family consent in some cases, and coercion in others coexisted. The numbers and conditions were not uniform.

Women were not only civilians or relatives of fighters. In the DSE, they served as fighters, nurses, liaisons, and political cadres, in percentages that increased as the recruitment pool narrowed. On the government side, they worked in health, administrative, and welfare organizations, while rural women supported families amidst displacement. Participation did not negate forced conscription or gendered violence.

In the cities, the arrival of displaced persons increased the pressure on housing, jobs, and services. In the villages, landmines, destroyed infrastructure, the absence of livestock, and the fear of a new attack made sowing and returning difficult. People were not simply divided into two armies: there were widows, orphans, the disabled, families with members on both sides, and minority communities facing particular suspicion. "Reconstruction" began while the social fabric was still disintegrating.

In western and central Macedonia, part of the Slavic-speaking population joined the DSE, another part remained neutral or served the government, and many simply tried to survive. The KKE's policy on the Macedonian question shifted, and in 1949, the position in favor of the national restoration of the "Macedonians" caused reactions even within the Left. We do not equate language, national identity, and political alignment. After the defeat, many of those who crossed the border came from these communities.

In early 1949, General Alexandros Papagos became Commander-in-Chief. The government army cleared the strongholds of the DSE in the Peloponnese and turned toward Macedonia. In the opposing camp, Zachariadis sidelined Vafiadis and insisted on a more conventional defense, even though the DSE was at a disadvantage in terms of air power, artillery, and reserves.

The rift between Tito and Stalin decisively changed the external environment. The relationship between the KKE and the Yugoslav leadership deteriorated, and in July 1949, the Yugoslav borders were closed to the DSE. Passages to Albania and Bulgaria remained, but the most important space for resupply, medical care, and retreat was lost.

In August, Operation "Pyrsos" struck positions in Vitsi and Grammos sequentially. The government army used overwhelming firepower, the air force, and American material. By the end of the month, the main forces of the DSE had been defeated, and those who could crossed into Albania. This was not the disappearance of every armed group in a single day, but the end of the DSE's ability to wage conventional war.

The casualties of the Civil War do not fit into a single, safe number. Military records use different definitions for combat dead, wounded, missing, captured, and deserters. Civilians died from executions, reprisals, landmines, bombings, disease, and hardship. The scale of the internally displaced is one figure, that of those who crossed into Eastern countries is another, and that of the children who were relocated is yet another. Every number requires a category, a period, and a source.

On 30 June, after the death of Sofoulis, Alexandros Diomidis became Prime Minister. On 16 October, the KKE leadership announced that the DSE was "laying down its arms." The phrasing indicated a pause and not a political reconciliation or a formal peace treaty. The KKE remained illegal, thousands of people were in prison, in exile, or outside Greece, and the executions did not stop immediately.

On 31 December 1949, the head of state was Paul and the Prime Minister was Diomidis. The government had won militarily, with decisive American support. The DSE had been defeated, while the fighters and political refugees who crossed the borders began a long exile. The country now possessed more foreign funding and a reconstruction plan, but also a devastated countryside, deep poverty, and a strict anti-communist state. Voting, employment in the public sector, the "certificate of social beliefs," and the possibility of return did not function on the same terms for winners and losers.

Varkiza did not "inevitably lead" to the Civil War on its own. The failure to protect political rights, the White Terror, the abstention of 1946, the KKE's choice to escalate the armed struggle, state repression, and foreign intervention created successive turning points. Recognizing the asymmetry of power does not excuse kidnappings, forced conscription, or executions by the DSE. And recognizing these acts does not justify torture, parastate violence, illiberal measures, or collective punishment by the state.

In the next episode, from 1950 to 1966, we will see how reconstruction, integration into the Western camp, emigration, and the political wounds of the Civil War shaped postwar Greece.

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